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Reckoning with Race and Disability
Jasmine E. Harris
abstract. Our national reckoning with race and inequality must include disability. Race and

disability have a complicated but interconnected history. Yet discussions of our most salient sociopolitical issues such as police violence, prison abolition, healthcare, poverty, and education continue to treat race and disability as distinct, largely biologically based distinctions justifying diﬀerential treatment in law and policy. This approach has ignored the ways in which states have relied
on disability as a tool of subordination, leading to the invisibility of disabled people of color in civil
rights movements and an incomplete theoretical and remedial framework for contemporary justice
initiatives. Legal scholars approach the analysis of race and disability principally as a matter of
comparative subordination (race and disability; race as disability; disability as race). More recent
scholarship, however, incorporates critical race and intersectionality to identify connections and
center those most marginalized within racial justice and disability rights movements. This body
of emerging legal scholarship creates fruitful points of entry, but still situates disability as an analytical tool for understanding racial subordination without due attention to disability’s co-constitutive function and its remedial lessons.
This Essay argues that aesthetic theories of disability discrimination oﬀer a comprehensive,
unifying lens to understand the roots of both race and disability discrimination, the nature of the
harms experienced by those with intersectional identities, and, perhaps most useful, the construction of remedies that can meaningfully address the endemic aesthetic origins of inequality. First,
an aesthetics lens shows how deeply rooted biases mark people of color with and without disabilities as deviant, incompetent, and unequal. These biases trigger aﬀective responses that, at first
blush, appear to be biological and visceral when, in fact, they are products of centuries of structural
subordination. Second, aesthetics help explain why norms of race and disability together are especially resistant to change. Third, aesthetic theories surface a misplaced faith in the quintessential
socio-legal prescription for inequality: training and education. While such interventions may be
necessary, this Essay cautions against their remedial suﬃciency and calls for training and education
designed with due attention to the lessons of aesthetics.

introduction
Reginald Latson, known as “Neli,” sat in the grass in front of his local public
library in Staﬀord County, Virginia, waiting for the building to open. While he

916

reckoning with race and disability

waited, a “concerned citizen” called the local police department about a suspicious person with a “hoodie” perhaps “with a gun” who was “loitering outside
the library.”1 Latson, an unarmed eighteen-year-old, had done nothing illegal.2
When the police oﬃcer arrived and ask him his name, he did not answer. Instead, believing he was in danger, Latson “responded with a ‘fight or flight’ reaction.”3 The oﬃcer arrested Latson and the Commonwealth of Virginia charged
him with felony assault on a law-enforcement oﬃcer, for which he received a
sentence of more than ten years in prison.4
The prosecutor gave short shrift to claims that the charges and noncompliant
behaviors documented by the oﬃcer were manifestations of Latson’s autism,
preferring to frame disability as a “convenience.”5 In Virginia, Stamper v. Commonwealth precluded Latson’s lawyer from presenting evidence of Latson’s disabilities—lay or expert testimony, documentary testimony, all prohibited—to
contextualize the facts presented at Latson’s bail hearing and criminal trial.6 Furthermore, while detained, the corrections oﬃcers also declined to acknowledge

1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

Ruth Marcus, Ruth Marcus: In Virginia, a Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Autism, WASH.
POST (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-in-virginia
-a-cruel-and-unusual-punishmentfor-autism/2014/11/14/9d7f6108-6c3b-11e4-b053-65cea79
03f2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/N4G7-6KXW]; Theresa Vargas, Remember Neli Latson,
the Black Teen with Autism Who Seemed ‘Suspicious’ Sitting Outside a Library? Ten Years After His
Arrest, He Still Isn’t Fully Free, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/remember-neli-latson-the-black-teen-with-autism-who-seemed-suspicious
-sitting-outside-a-library-ten-years-after-his-arrest-he-still-isnt-fully-free/2020/06/10
/53565cec-ab39-11ea-a9d9-a81c1a491c52_story.html [https://perma.cc/X3Y8-7W96] (detailing how the incident and his incarceration continue to aﬀect Latson).
Letter from Lamont Bagby, Virginia Delegate, et al., to Ralph Northam, Governor, Virginia
& Kelly Thomasson, Sec’y of Commonwealth (July 7, 2020) [hereinafter Northam Letter],
https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-Governor-Northam
-Re-Neli-Latson-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VND4-QNTA].
Id. at 1-2. Evidence of flight (broadly defined) is admissible in court as circumstantial evidence
of guilt; the fact finder must make the following inferential leaps: Latson’s behavior to his
attempts to flee; from his attempts to flee to consciousness of Latson’s guilt; from consciousness of Latson’s guilt to “consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged” in the case; and
from Latson’s “consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged” to his “actual guilt of the
crime charged.” United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
But see Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV.
2243, 2269-70 (2017) (arguing that courts assume evidence of flight to be relevant, and noting
that “[w]here people of color flee from police, a critical race inquiry reveals structural racial
bias entrenched in the evidentiary doctrine of flight”).
Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2.
Id.
324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985) (holding that “evidence of a criminal defendant’s mental state
at the time of the oﬀense is, in the absence of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of
guilt”).
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Latson’s disabilities and denied him necessary accommodations.7 Oﬃcers subjected Latson to prolonged restraints and seclusion; for example, he spent 182
out of a total of 243 days (approximately eight months) in solitary confinement
for up to twenty-four hours per day.8
Neli Latson is a Black, autistic man.9 How do we make sense of the role of
race10 and disability11 in the discrimination experienced by Neli? This Essay argues that current comparative and intersectional lenses oﬀer an incomplete picture of the nature of the harm and how best address it. While intersectionality12
certainly captures Neli Latson’s experience by shifting the focal point of analysis
to the cross-sections of race and disability (Neli’s experience as a Black, autistic
man),13 it does less work as a diagnostic and prescriptive lens. In other words,
intersectionality tells us to focus on all identities and how they come together to
7.

Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2.
Id. at 2; see also Brief Amici Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Plaintiﬀ-Appellant and Reversal at 6-8, Latson v. Clarke, No. 1:16-cv-0039 (W.D. Va. Feb. 11,
2019) (describing the conditions of Latson’s confinement including almost complete isolation
and deprivation of access to sensory stimuli, basic hygiene products, and regular nutrition).
9. Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 1. This Essay moves between person first language and identity first language to illustrate the current conversations taking place in disability communities
about self-identification and the role of the impairment in identity. People’s First/Person First
language came out of the self-advocates’ movement primarily among people with intellectual
and developmental disabilities. Identity First language is a more contemporary move to recognize the importance of disability in their identity and move from person with autism, for
example, to autistic or autistic person. See Lydia X.Z. Brown, The Significance of Semantics:
Person-First Language: Why It Matters, AUTISTIC HOYA (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www
.autistichoya.com/2011/08/significance-of-semantics-person-first.html [https://perma.cc
/TB5L-VS7W].
10. This Essay primarily discusses the relationship between “blackness” and disability. I recognize
that the experiences of other historically marginalized groups are important and may be different. In future work, I will explore these diﬀerent relationships with disability, for example,
constructions of disability in Latinx communities and law’s role in that construction.
11. I adopt a broad socio-legal definition of disability informed but not limited by the federal
definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act: a person with a disability is
one who has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits” their lives in some
way. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018).
12. Intersectionality brings a degree of vagueness as to what it is exactly. Is it theory, perspective,
methodology, or a general perspective by which to view the world? It can be all of the above
though such nuances matter to how we think about its application and whether it can produce
plausible remedies in law and society.
13. Gender also plays an important role here but will not be addressed in depth; however, given
its intimate connection to other axes of subordination, I will briefly oﬀer some thoughts. The
fact that Neli is a Black autistic male triggers particular aesthetic and emotional responses in
the aggregate. See Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 895
(2020) (constructing a theory of the “aesthetics of disability” as a more comprehensive way
to understand the deep aesthetic and emotional roots of disability discrimination in society).
8.

918

reckoning with race and disability

form a distinct, new type of experience of discrimination. But it does not, in the
case of race and disability, tell us about the source of intersectional marginalization or the tension between identity labels in communities of color—all necessary insights to help design more accurate legal remedies.
Aesthetic theories of discrimination, this Essay contends, can supplement the
vagaries surrounding intersectionality as an analytical lens to understand race
and disability.14 First, an aesthetics lens shows how deeply rooted biases mark
people of color with and without disabilities as deviant, incompetent, and unequal. These biases trigger aﬀective responses that, at first blush, appear to be
biological and visceral when, in fact, they are the product of centuries of structural subordination. Second, aesthetics help explain why norms of race and disability together are especially resistant to change. Third, aesthetic theories surface a misplaced faith in training and education as a prescription for inequality,
particularly in the context of the criminal-justice system.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I oﬀers a descriptive account of the
existing legal scholarship15 on race and disability. Part II then uses the opening
example of Neli Latson to explain what is missing from the current scholarship.
Part III argues that aesthetic and aﬀective theories of discrimination oﬀer a unifying lens that further develops the meaning of intersectionality in the context
of race and disability. I then apply an aesthetic lens to Neli Latson’s case to begin
to build a broader remedial framework for intersectional discrimination.16 I conclude with a few questions to consider as legal scholars continue to cultivate critical disability frameworks in law.

14.

Aesthetic theories concern what we see as beautiful and pleasurable. I am interested in how
we render aesthetic judgments and how these assessments influence human behavior and
proclivity to discriminate against those bearing non-normative markers of beauty. See, e.g.,
Dominic Mciver Lopes, Aesthetic Experts, Guides to Value, 73 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM
235, 237 (2015) (“Aesthetic evaluations are . . . dispositional states of mind attributing aesthetic merits or demerits . . . . [T]he agent attributes aesthetic values to the object of the act,
so that, were diﬀerent values attributed to the object, then the act would have gone diﬀerently.”). My work most closely aligns with aesthetics scholars thinking about “body aesthetics”—how we evaluate and respond to certain physical, behavioral, and auditory markers of
diﬀerence—as sources of socio-political oppression. See, e.g., Sherri Irvin, Introduction: Why
Body Aesthetics, in BODY AESTHETICS 1-10 (2016) (“Aesthetic standards thus serve a disciplinary function, maintaining oppressive norms of race, gender, and sexuality.”). See generally
Harris, supra note 13.
15. I include some disability-justice work in here as well because, while the authors are not legal
scholars, they analyze critical disability legal issues and belong in this group.
16. Part III sets up future work in this area.
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i. survey of legal scholarship on race and disability
In 2010, Beth Ribet reviewed existing scholarship on race and disability.17
She argued that disability scholarship required greater theorizing about intersectionality and association with critical race studies (CRS) and that “[r]elatively
few” CRS scholars have incorporated disability into their scholarship.18 Part I
primarily builds upon Ribet’s discussion of scholarship. It picks up where her
analysis left oﬀ to capture more recent scholarly conversations that respond to
the past decade’s transformative movements.19
17.

Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through a Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J. L. &
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209, 209 (2010). Her review was not limited to legal scholarship
and engaged with a broader swarth of interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., id. at 213-14 (discussing the work in this area by Douglas Baynton, Susan Schweik, and Gregory Michael
Dorr).
18. Id.
19. I frame scholars and scholarship broadly considering the roadmaps to the papers and overall
methodology. As a result, the list of scholars is not exhaustive but illustrative and meant to
open the conversation on what scholarship already exists, its limitations, and identity holes
not explored. Contemporary civil-rights movements have emerged since 2010 including the
expansion of United We Dream (DREAMers), Black Lives Matter, a resurgence of feminism
including the “fourth wave” that surfaced in 2012, the Women’s marches, and MeToo. See, e.g.,
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020
/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/5QHC-WFUL] (calling the Black Lives Matter Movement’s protests after George Floyd’s death the largest social
movement in U.S. history with somewhere between 15 and 26 million participants over the
course of a short period of time in about 4,700 protests nationwide); id. (comparing the Black
Lives Matter protests to the Women’s March on Washington in 2017 that had between three
and five million people); id. (noting that the civil-rights marches in the 1960s were “considerably smaller in number” such that if you add up all of the marches the numbers of people
are a few hundred thousand); see also Bonnie Chiu, 2020s Mark a New Wave of Feminist Mobilization, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniechiu/2020/03/08
/2020s-mark-a-new-wave-of-feminist-mobilization/?sh=378558de485e [https://perma.cc
/AD6V-PRSV] (discussing the rise of new forms of feminist activism and organizing to be
both “intersectional and intergenerational”). The past decade brought Donald Trump to the
White House and with it visible conservative and white-supremacy movements, culminating
in the riots at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. See, e.g., Walter J. Nicholls & Tara Fiorito, Dreamers Unbound: Immigrant Youth Mobilizing, 24 NEW LAB. F. 86, 86 (2015) (describing the
DREAMers as “[o]ne of the most important social movements in the United States”); Rob
Cameron, White Supremacy Created the Capitol Assault, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 11, 2021), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/11/white-supremacy-capitol-assault-trump-supporters [https://
perma.cc/4S4D-4NR3] (“[T]he modern conservative movements have always been a safe
space for the privileges of white rage . . . . What happened on Capitol Hill was not an accident.
It wasn’t an act of God. This wasn’t an aberration; it was part of a pattern.”); Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), https://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers
[https://perma.cc/UC6M-8PEW] (discussing the advent of the #MeToo movement).
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A. Comparative Subordination
Comparative subordination scholarship notably treats disability and race as
distinct categories. Ribet describes “comparative subordination” as scholarship
that primarily “relies on analogy and application of racially based analysis to disability, interchanging disability as a category of oppression with race as a category of oppression.”20 Adrienne Asch, according to Ribet, falls into this category
because she “treats race and disability as relatively discrete categories, focusing
on how the two compare, and in some moments degenerating into a debate
about which oppression or experience is harder or worse.”21 The identifying feature of this category, irrespective of the identity gate one enters, is the treatment
of disability and race as separate categories.
Many foundational disability law-review articles adopted a comparative approach to race and disability, in part, because that was where the law was developing. For example, disability legal scholars like Ruth Colker and Sam Bagenstos
have argued, a shift from individual conceptions of discrimination to a structural
subordination approach allows for greater theorizing across categories and possibilities for coalition-building.22 In the 1990s and early 2000s, this position in
legal scholarship tracked the goals of the disability-rights movement seeking to
develop a broader socio-political disability identity.23 In fact, narratives of

20.

Ribet, supra note 17, at 209.
Id.; see Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism and Disability: Reflections on Social Justice
and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2001).
22. Ruth Colker authored a series of highly influential articles making the move from individual
rights to group anti-subordination eﬀorts. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A
Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415 (2007); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (theorizing across
race and sex); Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.
J. 59 (1987) (distinguishing between anti-diﬀerentiation whose goal is assimilationist to absorb diﬀerence into existing norms and anti-subordination which is not opposed to diﬀerence
unless it results in subordination of historically marginalized groups such as women and Black
Americans); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L.
REV. 397 (2000) (arguing that “an understanding of disability as subordination . . . should
frame the approach of courts in interpreting the statutory ‘disability’ definition”). I would
count my own work in this category though my aesthetics article brought the need for intentional engagement with race into view for me. I make note of future work to wrestle with
questions of race and disability. This Essay is the beginning of that work.
23. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Diﬀerent Diﬀerence: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004) (rooting disability within the broader civilrights framework).
21.
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“sameness” among neatly packaged, protected classes may have helped move the
Americans with Disabilities Act through Congress from bill to law.24
Since 2010, legal scholars within disability law and equality law more broadly
have further developed the comparative model. The legal scholarship largely falls
into three subcategories under the comparative type:25 (1) Disability and Race;
(2) Disability as Race; and (3) Race as Disability. I describe and oﬀer an example
of work in each category below.
1. Disability and Race
The scholarship in this category is largely consistent in form and focus as
described previously; it compares race and disability discrimination in service of
situating disability within the broader civil-rights paradigm and oﬀering insights about the disability “perspective” in the race context or vice versa. Mark
Weber, for example, pinpoints critical comparisons and points of departure
among disability, race, and sex discrimination laws.26 For instance, Weber describes that while animus drives discrimination in the race (and sex) context,
animus does less work in the disability space. Attitudes about disability may be
driven by a diﬀerent emotion entirely such as by pity or benevolence. Therefore,
disability law may require diﬀerent designs than race and other areas of antidiscrimination law.27
Disability activists framed disability rights as an extension of the Civil Rights
Act. They drew power, broad-based support, and issue legitimacy from crossmovement analogies. However, there were some civil-rights leaders who, cognizant of the discursive use of disability language as a tool of subordination to disenfranchise Black people, rejected associations with disability and sought distance from an emerging disability-rights movement.28 Historical references to
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
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See generally LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST US MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 9-10 (2015) (emphasizing the deliberate adoption of a civil-rights frame for disability rights at least in part to make
disability rights appear to be a simple extension of other civil-rights protections from the 1964
Civil Rights Act).
These subtypes are my addition to Ribet’s more general “comparative subordination” category.
Mark C. Weber, Intent in Disability Discrimination Law: Social Science Insights and Comparisons
to Race and Sex Discrimination, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 162.
Id. at 167-68.
See, e.g., Jeﬀrey A. Brune, Blind Like Me: John Howard Griﬃn, Disability, Intersectionality, and
Civil Rights in Postwar America, 50 AFR. AM. REV. 203, 215 (2017); Josh Lukin, Disability and
Blackness, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 308, 309 (Lennard J. Davis. Ed., 4th ed., 2013)
(quoting Black disabled activist, Johnnie Lacy) (“I believe that Black Americans see disability
in the same way that everybody else sees it—[perceiving people with disabilities as] worthless,

reckoning with race and disability

race in disability emphasize the role of the Black Panthers in the San Francisco
504 sit-ins in 1977—a formative moment in the disability-rights movement’s history.29 For more than three weeks, people with disabilities occupied the oﬃces
of the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) to protest HEW
Secretary Joseph Califano’s delay in issuing regulations to enforce section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited recipients of federal dollars
from discriminating on the basis of disability.30 Blind Black activist Donald Galloway worked at the Center for Independent Living in the early 1970s. He described the support Black leaders gave to disability-rights activists, particularly
in the San Francisco Bay area. This included support from the Black Panther
Party.31
2. Disability as Race32
Craig Konnoth advances an interesting descriptive and normative claim in
his recent work.33 He describes a shift from social constructivism at the heart of

29.

30.
31.

32.
33.

mindless—without realizing that this is the same attitude held by others toward Black Americans. This belief, in eﬀect cancels out the black identity they share with a disabled black person, both socially and culturally, because the disability experience is not viewed in the same
context as if one were only black, and not disabled. Because of this myopic view, I as a black
disabled person could not share in the intellectual dialogue viewed as exclusive to black folk.
In other words, I could be one or the other but not both.”).
See FRED PELKA, WHAT WE HAVE DONE: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 220-222; 268-74 (2012); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 67 (1993).
Lukin, supra note 28, at 310.
Id.; see also Susan Schweik, Lomax’s Matrix: Disability, Solidarity, and the Black Power of 504, 31
DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2011) (arguing that the Black Panther Party did much more than
“bring[] food” for the 504 protestors; they adopted a “‘frame extension’ from their previous
struggles to the arena of disability rights protest,” in particular, because of Bradley Lomax, “a
disabled Panther and a Panther disability rights/independent living movement leader”); Eileen AJ Connelly, Overlooked No More: Brad Lomax, a Bridge Between Civil Rights Movements,
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/obituaries/brad-lomax
-overlooked.html [https://perma.cc/37JH-HWCH] (discussing Brad Lomax, a Black wheelchair user with multiple sclerosis, as a bridge between the Black Panther Party and the disability-rights movement in the 1970s and describing, for example, how, in 1975, Lomax approached Ed Roberts, the director of the Center for Independent Living in Berkeley and
suggested that the Center for Independent Living join forces with the Black Panthers to assist
disabled Black people in East Oakland).
A more appropriate label for this section is “Medicalization” as Race. For purposes of continuity with the other section headers, however, I use “disability” in quotations.
Craig Konnoth, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (2020).
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civil rights to a proliferation of what he calls “medical civil rights,”34 or legal
rights (and entitlements) that flow from one’s individual medical status.35
Whereas disability and race scholars tend to reject (with good reason) medical
diagnostic-driven approaches to rights given the troubled history of medicine as
a means of pathologizing diﬀerence, Konnoth argues that this coercion is no different from the highly assimilationist antidiscrimination frameworks operating
right now.36 He encourages us to embrace rather than shun medicalization because “problems framed as medical are relatively insulated from political tides,”
problems such as poverty, food insecurity, lack of access to health insurance or
care, or homelessness (issues that disproportionately aﬀect people of color).37 In
other words, framing racial-justice issues in medical terms (around specific diagnoses) oﬀers, on balance, according to Konnoth, a fruitful direction for an already problematic body of civil-rights law.
3. Race as Disability
Kimani Paul-Emile has framed race as disability to draw on the remedial benefits of disability antidiscrimination law to mitigate racial injustice.38 More specifically, Paul-Emile focuses her attention on Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act as a tool for addressing discriminatory state action against Black
people such as material inequities in education and policing practices like racial
profiling and stop and frisk.39 Paul-Emile’s framing of blackness as disability emphasizes the ideological and remedial ineﬀectiveness of “race law,” or civil-rights
laws and Supreme Court equal-protection jurisprudence focused on race. 40 She
argues for greater use of disability law, not only remedially, but also ideologically

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
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Id. at 1171; see also Rabia Belt & Doron Dorfman, Reweighing Medical Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 176, 177 (2020) (arguing that “[t]he advancement of the medical civil rights
approach reflects the tension between the older model of disability advocacy and the newer
disability rights activism”); Allison K. Hoﬀman, How Medicalization of Civil Rights Could Disappoint, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 166 (2020) (responding to Konnoth’s article and arguing that, on balance, the medicalized frame will cause more harm than good).
Konnoth, supra note 33, at 1172.
Id. at 1173-74.
Id. at 1128, 1134-37.
See Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293, 296 (2018) (“[B]lackness
in the United States has an independent disabling eﬀect distinct from the eﬀects of socioeconomic status . . . . Understanding blackness as disabling, however, brings to the fore a surprising new approach to addressing discrimination and systemic inequality that has been hiding in plain sight: disability laws.”).
Id. at 297, 352-60.
Id. at 293, 296. However, disability law is not without its flaws.

reckoning with race and disability

to “capture the historical meaning and contingencies of race in ways that race law
does not allow.”41
Importantly, this framework fits within the broader comparative subordination frame precisely because it too treats race and disability as distinct.42 PaulEmile’s argument is not that a disproportionate number of Black people are also
people with disabilities who might meet the statutory definition and thus be entitled to disability legal remedies for discrimination under Title II. Instead, PaulEmile posits that Black people might argue that blackness itself meets the threshold definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act: “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”43
Ann C. McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper seek to expand the concept of intersectionality to include race and disability by organizing the protected group
around shared experiences of childhood trauma. They draw on P.P. v. Compton
Unified School District (Compton case),44 to argue that cases seeking remedies for
structural racial discrimination might reframe these cases as a disability cases.45
The Compton case held that school districts had an aﬃrmative responsibility to
serve the majority students of color (57% Latinx, 40% Black, 1% Asian) in the
community who were, as a group, subjected to “adverse childhood events” on
the basis of violence, poverty, and social determinants of health that produced
long-term trauma.46 Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for
example, these students met the legal definition of “qualified individual with a
disability” and, as a group, had standing to challenge Compton Unified School
District’s (CUSD) failure to modify the curriculum and programming (and promote trauma-informed education) to meet the needs of the students.47 McGinley
and Cooper seek a structural remedy for a harm that has led to extended trauma.

41.
42.

43.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 289-99.
See Lukin, supra note 28, at 309 (quoting Black disabled activist, Johnnie Lacy) (“I also discovered . . . that many African-Americans consider being black as having a disability, and so
they didn’t really identify with disability as a disability but just as one other kind of inequality
that black people had to deal with.”).
Paul-Emile, supra note 38, at 328 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A) (2012)). Paul-Emile goes into greater detail in her paper connecting “blackness”
to each element of the legal definition. Thereafter, she moves to the substantive discussion of
whether Title II of the ADA could oﬀer structural reforms when race law cannot. See id. at 33160.
135 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (C.D. Ca. 2015).
See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Intersectional Cohorts, Dis/ability, and Class, 47
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 297 (2020).
Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 306-07, 307 n.53.

925

the yale law journal forum

June 30, 2021

They use the concept of “intersectional cohort” that would, according to their
argument, advance group-based claims through class actions recognizing that
the students of color in these communities are similarly situated and mutually
aﬀected by adverse childhood events, namely trauma.48
While McGinley and Cooper deploy an intersectional lens to their analysis
of trauma and race, their main engagement with disability studies and legal
scholarship is to think of disability law as a remedy and a hook. In this sense,
this type of scholarship may fall more squarely in the “race as disability” camp.
B. Intersectionality49
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s groundbreaking work on intersectionality unearthed
critical voids in antidiscrimination law and policy related to race and gender.50
Yet, but for a handful of exceptions, discussions of race and disability do not use
a critical-intersectional lens to interrogate inequities or a central subject of legal

48.

Id. at 296, 304 (“Recognizing poor, Black or Latinx students in violence-torn urban environments as a class in cases like Compton is appropriate because of their shared self-identities and
identity performances in response to their common attributed identities, especially given that
their claim is backed by the science of ACEs.”).
49. There are many areas of legal scholarship that apply a critical-race lens and discuss disability
less directly including race and medicine in reproductive justice, eugenics, genetic discrimination, criminal law, and psychiatric disabilities. See MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE
WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD (2020); DOROTHY
ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) [hereinafter ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION]; DOROTHY
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY
(1997); Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental Health, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615 (2016); Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing
Race and Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1 (2010); Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E.
Roberts, Poverty, Welfare Reform, and the Meaning of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425 (2001).
50. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F.139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241(1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins];
see also Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 542 (arguing that “minority
feminist legal scholar[s] . . . must document the material legal existences of minority women”
and “explore their concrete problems and needs, many of which are invisible even to minority
lawyers because of gender and class diﬀerences”); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title
VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 719 (2015) (“[O]ften spoken of the ‘twin immoralities’ of ‘Jim and Jane Crow,’ [Pauli Murray] theorized black women’s singular experience in language that anticipated the concept Crenshaw would term ‘intersectionality’ a quarter-century later.”).
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inquiry.51 Crenshaw argued that our system of protected classifications artificially siloed a person’s identity such that one could be a woman or Black person
but, at least categorically for antidiscrimination purposes, not both.52 Importantly, Crenshaw surfaced a central insight, that intersectional discrimination
operated independent of its components such that the experience of subordination could not simply be captured by any one classification. Intersectionality, in
that vein, also became a tool to highlight the experiences of women of color who
are not represented discretely in the discourse of either feminism or antiracism.53
Crenshaw’s work “highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed.”54
Other scholars like Dorothy Roberts—an expert in race, gender, health law,
and bioethics—have studied the construction of race through medicine.55 Roberts directly challenges the use of race as natural biological division. Race, according to Roberts, is an invention that justifies political inequality by pretending it is a natural, scientifically supported, division of human beings.56 Roberts
critiques the emphasis on comparative subordination to the exclusion of intersectionality:
Disability rights discourse largely has failed to encompass racism, and
anti-racism discourse largely has failed to encompass disability. The disability rights and civil rights movements are often compared as two separate struggles that run parallel to each other, rather than struggles that
have constituents and issues in common, even as both people of color
51.

52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

For one exception, see BLACKNESS AND DISABILITY: CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS AND CULTURAL
INTERVENTIONS (Christopher M. Bell ed., 2011). Other literature on intersectionality in the
context of gender and disability or disability and sexual identity has oﬀered interesting parallels and points of departure. See, e.g., ROBERT MCRUER & MICHAEL BÉRUBÉ, CRIP THEORY:
CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY (2006); ROBERT MCRUER, An Austerity of
Representation; or, Crip/Queer Horizons: Disability and Dispossession, in CRIP TIMES: DISABILITY,
GLOBALIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 55 (2018); Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Misfits: A Feminist
Materialist Disability Concept, 26 HYPATIA 591 (2011).
See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 50, at 139-40 (arguing that some experience compounded subordination because they exist at the intersections
of multiple marginalized identities).
Id.
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 50, at 1245.
See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Is Race-Based Medicine Good for Us?: African American Approaches
to Race, Biomedicine, and Equality, 36 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 537 (2008).
See ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION, supra note 49, at 4 (“Like citizenship, race is a political system
that governs people by sorting them into social groupings based on invented biological demarcations. Race is not only interpreted according to invented rules, but, more important,
race itself is an invented political grouping. Race . . . is a political category that has been disguised as a biological one.”).
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and people with disabilities share a similar experience of marginalization
and “othering” and even though there are people of color with disabilities . . . .57
Returning to Ribet’s work, she seeks to import disability studies into CRS to
show how it can challenge and “dismantl[] White supremacy.”58 Ribet examines
how race and disability are both concepts that are socially constructed. She also
highlights the interconnectedness of race and disability by people who hold both
identities.59 Disability and race are both channels through which “normalcy or
ideal physicality” are funneled.60 Ribet, working from a disability-studies position, asks why disabled people are marginalized in the first place, rather than
solely analyzing why people of color are treated like disabled people.61 This move
centers not only those people of color who may not have impairments but are
treated like they do, but it also includes people of color with impairments and
those with severe disabilities.
Notably, much of the work on intersectionality in the context of race and
disability has taken place in the realm of disability studies and not disability law.
Yet disability legal scholars have begun to embrace intersectionality and, in doing so, apply it selectively to discrete issues disproportionately aﬀecting disabled
people of color such as special education, policing, and prison abolition work.
For example, disability studies scholars, Subini Ancy Annamma, David Connor, and Beth Ferri coined the term “DisCrit” in 2013: a dual analysis of race and
ability they apply to education.62 Annamma, Connor, and Ferri believe that racism and ableism work in ways that validate and reinforce each other, and for

57.

58.
59.
60.

61.
62.
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Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: The Case of Race, Gender,
Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 DE BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 313, 317 (2013)
(citing Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 49).
Ribet, supra note 17, at 212.
See id. at 211.This intersectionality approach is similar to that of Crenshaw.
Id. at 212-13 (describing “White deviance” as being explained by disability while “the constructions of People of color are correspondingly synonymous with abnormalcy, dangerous
deviance or (infectious) moral sickness,” all of which bleed into “disabled”). This idea is a part
of my aesthetics theory explored in Part III, infra.
See id. at 213.
See Subini Ancy Annamma, David Connor & Beth Ferri., Dis/ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit): Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/ability, 16 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 1, 1, 4
(2013) (acknowledging that recent scholars have taken more valuable intersectional approaches and identifying the following: “(1) anticategorical frameworks that insist on race,
class, and gender as social constructs/fictions; (2) intracategorical frameworks that critique
merely additive approaches to diﬀerences as layered stigmas; and (3) constitutive frameworks
that describe the structural conditions within which social categories in the above models are
constructed by (and intermeshed with) each other in specific historical contexts”).
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students of color, the two do not exist apart from each other.63 Similar to other
intersectional thought leaders in disability studies, they use DisCrit as a lens to
show how race and ability are “intertwined in terms of identity.”64 One of the
tenets of DisCrit is that it “values multidimensional identities and troubles singular notions of identity such as race or dis/ability or class or gender or sexuality,
and so on.”65 Furthermore, DisCrit scholars show that the tension that exists between disability studies and critical race theory comes from a longstanding history of treating Black Americans as disabled to justify denying the group rights—
a history that has caused Black Americans especially to push back against voluntarily identifying as disabled.66
Other scholars use critical race theories to understand disability-specific issues where people of color are more present. Brianne Dávila, for example, applies
an intersectional lens to special education and Latinx students. “Disability,” she
argues, “does not simply replace race . . . but represents a complex interplay of
race and disability in the lives of Latina/o students in special education.”67 Applying intersectionality to data collection, Beth Ferri and David Connor comment that data on “‘racial inequalities in special education’ . . . is not suﬃciently
disaggregated to fully tease out how the problem of overrepresentation impacts
students diﬀerently across disability category, race, class, gender, and school context.”68 In part, this tracks a general belief that race and ability overlap and provide a useful way for sorting students.69
Collectively, these scholars link disability and race through the prevalence of
disability within race (that is, race is the dominant lens),70 but also note that the

63.
64.
65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 2-5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 18-21; see also Jamelia N. Morgan, Toward a DisCrit Approach to American Law, in
DISCRIT EXPANDED: INQUIRIES, REVERBERATIONS & RUPTURES (Annamma, Connor, Ferri, et
al. forthcoming 2021) (describing Annamma et al.’s work on intersectionality and advocating
for its application to particular areas of law).
Brianne Dávila, Critical Race Theory, Disability Microaggressions and Latina/o Student Experiences in Special Education, 18 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 443, 454 (2014).
Beth A. Ferri & David J. Connor, Special Education and the Subverting of Brown, 8 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 57, 61, 63 (2004).
See id. at 63.
Id. at 61-62 (“In fact, black students remain the most over-represented of all groups, especially
in the more subjective disability categories of MR, ED, and LD (learning disability) in nearly
every state.”).
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relationship between the two is not absolute: “For example, racial disparities are
not apparent in less subjective categories, such as blindness or deafness.”71
Liat Ben-Moshe advances perhaps the most Crenshaw-consistent approach
to disability-race intersectionality in legal scholarship right now. Ben-Moshe’s
scholarship, like that of other scholars writing in the intersectional (race-disability) space, examines education as a site of critical analysis.72 Ben-Moshe explains the need for an intersectional analysis, in part, comes from the disabilityrights movement’s adoption of the civil-rights blueprint as a model for antidiscrimination eﬀorts.73 As a result, Ben-Moshe aligns her work with a growing
disability-justice movement rooted in intersectionality.74 Ben-Moshe applies intersectionality not only to education but also to family law75 and, most recently,

71.

72.

73.
74.

75.

930

Id. at 63. Amanda Merkwae also treats intersectionality as a gateway through which to enter
the discussion of discipline of disabled students of color in school: “Compared with their
White peers, Black students are ‘twice as likely to be identified as ED [emotionally disturbed]
and 2.7 times as likely to be identified as CI [cognitively impaired]’ and Native American students are ‘nearly twice as likely to be identified as SLD [specific learning disability] and 60%
more likely to be identified as CI.’” Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and
the Conduct of School Resource Oﬃcers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 156 (2015) (quoting Amanda
L. Sullivan & Aydin Bal, Disproportionality in Special Education: Eﬀects of Individual and School
Variables on Disability Risk, 79 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 475, 476 (2013)). The diagnoses might be
valid, due to socioeconomic circumstances that impact brain development during an early age,
or may be misapplied, due to race-based cultural or linguistic diﬀerences. Id.
Liat Ben-Moshe & Sandy Magaña, An Introduction to Race, Gender, and Disability: Intersectionality, Disability Studies, and Families of Color, 2 WOMEN GENDER & FAMILIES COLOR 105, 107
(2014) (referencing “the term ‘DisCrit’ to denote the need for connecting critical race theory
with disability studies to highlight the interdependent, intersecting, and mutually constitutive aspects of race and disability in education and beyond”); see also DISABILITY INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 165 (Liat BenMoshe, Chair Chapman & Allison C. Carey, eds., 2014) (examining the ways in which disability and race operate in carceral spaces as mutually constitutive: prison is at once “detrimental for people with disabilities and responsible for creating new experiences of disabilities”).
Id. at 108; see Harris, supra note 13, at 916-31 (2019) (discussing “the logic of disability law”
based on the civil-rights blueprint centering integration).
SINS INVALID, SKIN, TOOTH, AND BONE: THE BASIS OF MOVEMENT IS OUR PEOPLE: A DISABILITY JUSTICE PRIMER 10-20 (2d ed. 2019) (discussing the origins of disability justice from the
shortcomings of disability rights); see also id. at 68 (“Simultaneously, disability justice is ultimately about re-imagining and reinventing all of our relationships with one another, as well
as with our own bodyminds. It is about transforming the very material and psychic frameworks that designate some bodies and minds as normative, valuable, and acceptable and others as deviant, worthless, or dangerous.”).
Id. at 108-09. Family law oﬀers an interesting point of analysis because non-Western cultural
approaches do not always align with the assumption that disabled people “should be independent from their families” as opposed to the interdependence sometimes celebrated in
“more collective[ist] cultures[s].” Id.
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the carceral state (prisons and psychiatric hospitals).76 She posits that, like disability, race should be viewed as a fluid and changing construct not limited to
color but also culture.77 Importantly, Ben-Moshe notes the lack of representation
of race in disability scholarship while commenting that
scholars performing intersectional analysis . . . may not choose to identify as disability studies scholars; they see these issues as part of their
overall racial, cultural, and sometimes marginalized experiences—an example of how disability identity is experienced in diﬀerent ways by persons with disabilities who are not white and middle class.78
Other disability law scholars have started to wrestle with intersectionality in
specific areas of disability law.79 First, Katherine Pérez argues that disability justice requires a union of critical race and disability studies.80 She oﬀers an example
of such union: the history exclusion of disabled people likely to become “public
charges.” This disproportionately aﬀects people with disabilities who may need
access to economic or healthcare supports to work independently, making the
regulation itself a self-fulfilling prophecy and grounds for exclusion.81
Second, Jamelia Morgan, another disability law scholar—who, like BenMoshe and Pérez, actively engages the tenets of disability justice—applies an intersectional lens to policing. Morgan refers to “disability in public.”82 These the-

76.

77.
78.

79.

80.

81.
82.

See LIAT BEN-MOSHE, supra note 72; DISABILITY INCARCERATED (Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris Chapman & Allison C. Carey, eds. 2014); Liat Ben-Moshe, Dis-epistemologies of Abolition, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 345 (2018).
Ben-Moshe & Magaña, supra note 72, at 110.
Id. at 111; see also Ashmeet Kaur Oberoi, Fabricio Balcazar, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, F.L. Fredrik G. Langi & Valentina Lukyanova, Employment Outcomes Among African American and White
Women with Disabilities: Examining the Inequalities, 3 WOMEN GENDER & FAMILIES COLOR 144
(2015) (showing how white disabled women and black disabled women experience employment discrimination diﬀerently because of race).
See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reproducing Dignity: Race, Disability, and Reproductive Controls, 54
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 200 (2020) (discussing the shared subordination of Black women and
disabled women in reproductive justice—the right not to have a child, the right to have a child,
and the right to parent that child).
See, e.g., Katherine Pérez, A Critical Race and Disability Legal Studies Approach to Immigration
Law and Policy, UCLA L. REV.: L. MEETS WORLD (Feb. 2019), https://www.uclalawreview
.org/a-critical-race-and-disability-legal-studies-approach-to-immigration-law-and-policy
[https://perma.cc/L998-YHTC].
Id.
Jamelia Morgan, Policing Under Disability Law, 73 STAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13-23) (on file with author).
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ories of policing non-normative bodies, behavior, and minds, however, are fundamentally aesthetic and aﬀective theories of disability.83 That is, the social
model of disability alone does not address the roots of why policing and oﬃcer
training, for example, are unlikely to make meaningful dents in sedimented biases that have shaped law-enforcement institutions from their onset. In fact, as
I have argued elsewhere, while the social model of disability underwrites disability antidiscrimination statutes, at least aspirationally, it does not explain the
aesthetic-aﬀective responses people experience in the presence of race and disability and, therefore, is incomplete as a descriptive or normative approach.84
ii. evaluating current approaches to race and disability
Part II analyzes existing approaches to race and disability in three steps. First,
I synthesize the current literature and extract three key lessons in the aggregate.
Second, I take these lessons and revisit Neli Latson’s story to illustrate their analytical value and highlight the diﬀerences between the two meta-approaches
(comparative subordination and intersectionality). Third, I identify three critical
omissions in the current literature to facilitate the development of a more comprehensive intersectional approach to race and disability.
A. From Comparative Subordination to Intersectionality
Overall, the comparative subordination literature on race and disability takes
as its starting point existing antidiscrimination laws and seeks to maximize its
utility. For example, the disability and race subcategory maintains existing siloes
in law—codified in statutes or common law as protected classes. Scholars compare disability with race and gender discrimination to illustrate the structural
and institutional roots across areas. The goal of this type of scholarship is to mine
individual classes—race, gender, disability, sexuality—for similarities that can be
used to cross-pollinate and generate remedial theories—such as anti-subordination—to unite protected classes within existing doctrinal constraints.
Comparative subcategories such as disability as race further entrench medical
frames historically used to marginalize racially disfavored groups. Scholars in
this camp encourage the use of medical frames, in part, to access public benefits
and social supports to mitigate the eﬀects of structural racism on communities
of color. Over one million Black Americans, for example, reside within a half mile
83.

Harris, supra note 13, at 945-46 (oﬀering policing as an ideal example of where race and disability intersect to create aesthetic-aﬀective discrimination) and 950-63 (reframing disability
discrimination in aesthetic-aﬀective terms).
84. See infra Part III (discussing the benefits of aesthetic theories).
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of natural gas facilities and, the toxic emissions from those facilities place them
at higher risks of cancer.85 Rates of asthma are also high in Black communities;86
in fact, one study by the Clean Air Task Force and the NAACP found that Black
children in these communities experience 138,000 asthma attacks, translating
into roughly 101,000 lost school days each year.87 The harm itself is the existence
of disability in this subcategory; in the example above, the harm is asthma
among Black children. Asthma diagnoses, therefore, may oﬀer families of children with asthma greater access to scarce economic supports or public benefits
such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or monthly cash assistance, as well
as, in some states, simultaneous access to Medicaid as health insurance.88 Race,
however, continues to be the dominant lens to define the problem (i.e., how do
we solve the problem of race discrimination) and “disability” (more accurately
medical diagnosis), a means to an end. As a result, this utilitarian approach
rooted in welfare law does not recognize or advance disability as a valued sociopolitical identity axis.
By contrast, the race as disability comparative subcategory recognizes the limitations of the current antidiscrimination framework for race discrimination and
seeks to reframe the harm. Unlike the previous framework (disability as race),
however, this approach emphasizes the role of disability civil-rights laws, specifically, rather than public welfare as remedies for race discrimination. Reasonable
accommodations and the removal of access barriers become ways to mitigate race
discrimination, under this approach, particularly in the context of public programs and services such as carceral spaces (jails, prisons, detention centers) and
education.
Intersectionality takes one major step that distinguishes it from the scholarship in the comparative subordination category: both race and disability operate
as constructed identities and mutually reinforcing elements for critical reflection.
This scholarship, however, while developing within specific issue areas, lacks a

85.

Lesley Fleischman & Marcus Franklin, Fumes Across the Fence-Line: The Health Impacts of Air
Pollution from Oil & Gas Facilities on African American Communities, NAACP & CLEAN AIR TASK
FORCE 4 (2017), https://www.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/catf-rpt-naacp-4.21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KM6-XRMC].
86. “Approximately 13.4% of African American children have asthma (over 1.3 million), compared
to 7.3% of white children.” Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 4.
88. See Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI and Other Government Programs—2021 Edition, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm#:~:text=In
%20most%20States%2C%20if%20you,for%20Medicaid%20with%20another%20agency
[https://perma.cc/8PXV-7QYC] (“In most States, if you are an SSI recipient, you may be
automatically eligible for Medicaid; an SSI application is also an application for Medicaid.”).
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unifying theory of discrimination that captures the specific nature of the subordination, its methods and forms, and, consequently, specific ways to address it.89
B. Three Key Lessons from Existing Scholarship
Three key lessons emerge from the current scholarship on race and disability.
First, disability and race are more similar than dissimilar when understood in
tandem. That is, both are socially constructed categories manipulated by state
and private actors to maintain socio-political and economic power by framing
both categories in the language of biological determinism.
Second, legal scholars outside of disability law have increasingly reached for
disability remedies in the absence of viable curative pathways in the existing
civil-rights canon.90 These limitations are clear, yet selective deployment of disability law creates a tension between short term gains (receipt of benefits) and
the negative eﬀects of long-term framing (disability is an individual deficit and
tragedy). For example, Rabia Belt and Doron Dorfman have argued that the
“medicalization of civil rights” while perhaps fruitful for individuals seeking income supports through access to welfare benefits, may, in the long-term, undermine broader normative gains of the disability movements (disability rights, disability justice) to move away from biological frames of disability.91
Third, the emergence of Disability Justice as a movement and critical frame
is a contemporary example of intersectionality.92 Organically grown from the experiences of people with multiple marginalized identities, disability justice is a
powerful antisubordination lens that “marks a point of departure rather than a
destination.”93 That is, Disability Justice is a movement away from disabilityrights frames; it is about the process of reframing more than any one end product. Much like intersectionality, therefore, the intentionality of centering historically marginalized voices itself is transformative, much more than any one static

89.
90.

91.
92.

93.
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See infra Section II.C.
BELT & DORFMAN, supra note 34, at 176 (“Disability law seems seductive. Despite the general
parsimoniousness of U.S. welfare benefits, disabled people can receive tax breaks, financial
payments, and health care. Disability accommodations and modifications oblige employers,
government programs, and purveyors of public accommodations to provide remedies to the
mismatch between people’s disabilities and their services and programs.”).
Id. at 181.
SINS INVALID, supra note 74, at 10-20 (discussing the origins and meanings of “disability justice” and its relationship to the disability-rights movement); see also Katie Eyer, Claiming Disability, 101 B.U. L. REV. 547, 570 n.157 (2021) and accompanying text (discussing the birth of
Disability Justice as an alternative model).
SINS INVALID, supra note 74, at 10.
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by-product. The following Section returns to Neti Laton’s story to consider contemporary approaches and these three core lessons.
C. Application of Existing Approaches to Neli Latson’s Experience
How do existing approaches to race and disability help us understand Neli
Latson’s experience? First, consider a comparative-subordination approach that,
separately, applies a CRS lens and a critical disability lens. Using a CRS lens, we
can see the structural racism operating throughout—from the phone call to the
police that triggered the series of events to the lengthy sentence imposed and
likely his treatment in the detention facility that relied on restraint and seclusion
to control Latson.94 Documentation over the last few years highlights the disproportionate impact “concerned citizens’” calls to police have on people of color,
especially Black Americans, for “existing while Black.”95 Studies on the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion reveal that prosecutors—who also happen to be predominantly white96—disproportionately charge people of color for similar conduct relative to white people.97 The eﬀects of systemic racism may also aﬀect the

94.

See Marcus, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Chan Tov MacNamarah, White Caller Crime: Racialized Police Communication and
Existing While Black, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 337-41 (2019) (cataloguing recent incidents of
innocuous behavior by people of color that triggered phone calls to the police including “sitting in Starbucks; playing golf; eating at a Waﬄe House; sleeping in university common
rooms; eating in university class rooms; making purchases; returning purchases; smoking
cigarettes; moving into apartments; leaving apartments; going for walks; doing their jobs;
eating in restaurants; barbecuing; going to the gym; attending funerals; using too many or
the wrong coupons; swimming in pools; playing basketball; canvassing for political reelection; doing community service; mowing the lawn; sheltering from the rain; getting into their
cars; sitting in their cars; not listening to a neighbor’s problems; walking their dogs; wearing
costumes; wearing a bandana; and selling bottled water on a hot summer’s day” (citations
omitted)).
96. See Katherine J. Bies, Darryl G. Long Jr., Megan S. McKoy, Jimmy S. Threatt & Joshua D.
Wolf, Diversity in Prosecutors’ Oﬃces: Views from the Front Line, STAN. CRIM. JUST. CTR. 8-9
(2016),
https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Diversity-Case-Studies
-Final-3.12.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRU4-CDAC] (discussing the racial composition of
District Attorney Oﬃces in California and showing that even when selecting for those oﬃces
with the largest percentages of non-white prosecutors, the range of white prosecutors was still
between 53% and 81%).
97. See Timothy Williams, Black People Are Charged at a Higher Rate than Whites. What if Prosecutors Didn’t Know Their Race?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html [https://perma.cc/8YP4-J72C]. Williams describes the experience of Michael Smith, a twenty-three-year-old Black American
man in the Bay Area. Smith was “riding a train in San Francisco when a white man told him
that he smelled bad and should move away from him.” Id. The two men exchanged words and
Smith, ultimately, was restrained by police oﬃcers who accused Smith of assaulting them.
95.
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length of the sentence imposed and how corrections oﬃcers interact with Latson
relative to white detainees.98 For example, police and corrections oﬃcers may
have perceived Latson’s behavior as unruly and insolent, motivating them to exercise control over Latson’s “non-compliant” Black body.99
Applying a critical disability lens, we see other sources of subordination at
work. First, Latson’s failure to give the oﬃcer his name when asked and subsequent flight, taken together, are common manifestations of a “fight or flight”
response associated with people on the autism spectrum, particularly when they
are afraid.100 Second, the state of Virginia appears to have denied Latson his right
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act to be placed in the most
integrated setting appropriate.101 Virginia’s Department of Behavioral Health
and Disability Services oﬀered to help the facility holding Latson determine
what supports and modifications would be appropriate; however, “this oﬀer was
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The District Attorney’s Oﬃce “charged Smith with seven counts, including battery on a police
oﬃcer and resisting arrest.” Id.
See, e.g., Written Submission on Racial Disparities in Sentencing, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct.
27, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities
_aclu_submission_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQK5-ZJ2R] (“Sentences imposed on Black
males in the federal system are nearly 20 percent longer than those imposed on white males
convicted of similar crimes.”). While not specific to Virginia, the Commonwealth has recognized the existence of disparate treatment in sentencing and, and Governor Northam assembled a Commission to look at racial injustice in the criminal-justice system. See Press Release,
Oﬃce of the Governor, Governor Northam Signs Executive Order Establishing Commission
to Examine Racial Inequity in Virginia Law (June 4, 2019), https://www.governor.virginia
.gov/newsroom/all-releases/2019/june/headline-840916-en.html [https://perma.cc/6DW5
-X68C]; The Commission to Examine Racial Inequity in Virginia Law, Identifying and Addressing the Vestiges of Inequity and Inequality in Virginia Laws, GOVERNOR VA. (Nov. 15, 2020),
https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/governor-of-virginia/pdf
/2020-Commission-Report---Inequity-and-Inequality-in-Virginia-Law.pdf
See David M. Perry & Lawrence Carter-Long, The Ruderman White Paper on Media Coverage of
Law Enforcement Use of Force and Disability, RUDERMAN FAM. FOUND. 12, 14-15, 39 (2016),
https://rudermanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MediaStudy-Police
Disability_final-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9UN-Y5WD] (discussing Latson’s story and
police response to “non-complaint” behavior by individuals with disabilities generally).
See Marcus, supra note 1.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (2021) (“A public entity shall administer services, programs, and
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities.”) (emphasis added); 28 CFR § 35, App. B (2021) (defining the “most integrated
setting appropriate” as “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with
nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible”).
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inexplicably refused” and, instead, the prison placed Latson in solitary confinement, one of the most restrictive settings possible in the prison setting.102 Relatedly, the Department of Justice entered into an Olmstead settlement agreement
with Virginia in 2012 to ensure that people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities did not experience “unnecessary institutionalization” when less restrictive community-based placements might be more appropriate.103
A comparative-subordination approach, therefore, analyzes Latson’s story
through two separate lenses—critical race and disability—and then identifies
what insights each critical lens oﬀers into the discrimination experienced by
Latson. But such an approach is unable to fully capture how Latson experiences
the harm and how the diﬀerent community and institutional actors in this story
see him. Also, when we turn to remedies, a comparative-subordination approach
falls short because current legal frameworks require disaggregation of the harms
experienced by Latson.104 Latson, for example, may file a complaint in federal
court under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act to address the
Olmstead enforcement claims discussed above. He may file federal (and perhaps
state) constitutional claims such as cruel and unusual punishment or failure to
provide safety and minimal habilitation. He may have due process claims as well.
The point is that it would be diﬃcult to fully compartmentalize the harm and
certainly none of the legal options available reflects his actual experience.
Using an intersectional, disability-justice approach certainly helps locate the
compounded harms experienced by Latson as an autistic Black man. Intersectionalists might argue, for instance, that Latson’s blackness and disability place
him at heightened risks for extreme treatment and marginalization. The fact that
Latson was a tall Black male teenager at the time, much like Tamir Rice, likely
aﬀected how the oﬃcer responding to the community call perceived Latson’s
manifestations of his autism.105 For example, fifty-five percent of disabled Black

102.

Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2.
Settlement Agreement at 3, United States v. Virginia, No. 3:12-cv-00059-JAG (E.D. Va. Jan.
26), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/01/26/va-ada_settlement
_1-26-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ6Z-9UD8]; see Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S.
581, 597 (1999) (“Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as discrimination based
on disability.”).
104. This legal analysis does not depend on damages, which would raise questions about sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
105. See Finn Gardiner, Manuel Díaz & Lydia X. Z. Brown, Charles Kinsey’s Story Is About Race. It’s
Also About Ableism, SOJOURNERS (July 27, 2016), https://sojo.net/articles/charles
-kinseys-story-about-race-its-also-about-ableism [https://perma.cc/K4MP-NXW9].
103.
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people are arrested by age twenty-eight, a risk that is compounded for Black disabled men.106 Further disaggregation by disability shows that “people with autism spectrum disorders are seven times more likely to interact with police over
their lifetimes, compared with people without a cognitive disorder.”107
Other research shows that police oﬃcers have a skewed perception of the
criminality of young Black people relative to young white people.108 “[P]olice
interactions are part of a broader set of social practices that reconstitute black
boys so that they barely have currency as troubled teens, let alone children in
need of protection. Rather, they are seen as putative black men—or black men in
waiting—who deserve discipline, social control, and punishment.”109
Similarly, a young Black man seated on the grass in front of a library in a
white neighborhood may be about race, and the call by the community member
may have tipped the first domino. However, Latson’s actions to withhold his
name and flee—two behaviors more associated with disability than race—kept
the dominos in motion. Consider “the talk” that Black mothers have with their
Black children, in particular, Black boys, about interactions with police oﬃcers.110 “The precarious nature of police interactions forces Black parents to disregard the age of their children and implore them to engage in self-monitoring
behaviors (e.g., emotional regulation, image management) that are beyond their
developmental purview.”111 Latson’s mother may have had a similar talk with
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Erin J. McCauley, The Cumulative Probability of Arrest by Age 28 Years in the United States by
Disability Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1977, 1980 (2017).
Rebecca Hersher, For Parents of Young Black Men with Autism, Extra Fear About Police, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/08/23
/342688183/for-parents-of-young-black-men-with-autism-extra-fear-about-police [https://
perma.cc/H8R9-78WW].
Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence? 51 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REV. 159, 172 (2016).
Id. at 173. See also Jamelia Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing the discriminatory eﬀect of disorderly-conduct laws and the ways
they are utilized to police behavior in ways that reinforce “racism, sexism, and ableism”).
See Abril Harris & Ndidiamaka Amutah-Onukagha, Under the Radar: Strategies Used by Black
Mothers to Prepare Their Sons for Potential Police Interactions, 45 J. BLACK PSYCH. 439, 440 (2019)
(“The unique socialization process that occurs between Black mothers and their children incorporates learning about societal norms while accounting for implicit and explicit racism.”);
Alicia Montgomery, Autism, Like Race, Complicates Almost Everything, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr.
12, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/04/12/301814519/autism-like
-race-complicates-almost-everything [https://perma.cc/2J6P-XTFS] (describing her experience as a Black mother of a Black son on the spectrum: “[T]here’s that fear—the one that I
used to think only black parents really understood—that you could do everything right, spend
every dime, minute, ounce of energy on your child, and it still might not be enough”).
Harris & Amutah-Onukagha, supra note 110, at 441.
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him about how he would be perceived and what to do. However, in the moment,
under stress, his fight or flight impulse won out.
D. What’s Missing?
Existing analytical approaches to race and disability oﬀer important insights
into discrimination at the intersection of the two identity axes. However, we are
missing some critical points of nuance. This nuance matters because we want to
understand the nature of discrimination at the intersection, who it aﬀects, and
how it operates. Such a diagnostic assessment then best positions us to develop
legal and policy solutions to respond to the structural issues driving the bus. A
comparative-subordination lens captures only one form of subordination at a
time (race or disability and how one can inform the other), one identity axis, to
the exclusion of the other. Intersectionality, as currently constructed, while shifting the analytical center to ask how race and disability together aﬀect Latson’s
experience, does not fully address three issues: people at the intersections, tensions at the intersections, and the aftermath of intersectional discrimination.
1. People at the Intersections
Current approaches apply a one-dimensional approach to disability that
does not account for the specific relationship people of color have to disability.
We can think of the intersection of race and disability in at least three ways. First,
states and private actors have used disability labels to subordinate people of color
who have no impairment to maintain institutions and practices of white supremacy. These are people of color without any actual physical or mental impairment
who are nevertheless “regarded as” disabled and disenfranchised accordingly.112
Second, disability can be a direct by-product of structural racism. Consider
here the most literal forms of states creating impairments through wars, police
violence, incarceration, as well as through the less direct but nonetheless powerful social determinants of health such as barriers to meaningful access to health
care, education, employment, housing, wealth accumulation, and political
power. Similarly, environmental justice concerns show the ways environmental
hazards fall disproportionately on people of color, resulting in short- and long-

112.

A particularly unique innovation of the ADA is the “regarded as” prong of the definition of
disability. This oﬀers a remedy for disability discrimination to people without disabilities or
those whose disabilities do not meet the statutory definition of disability but who nonetheless
experience discrimination based on a perception that the person is disabled. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12102(1)(C), (3)(A), (B) (2018).
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term disability.113 The Flint, Michigan water crisis is such an example.114 People
of color in this category may have a diﬃcult relationship with disability. If a person’s respiratory conditions, for example, can be traced to the failure of a landlord to remove asbestos, or intellectual disability can be traced to failure to remove lead-based paint, how do they negotiate their relationship with
disability?115
Third, and relatedly, race and disability can mean both. Some people of color
are also disabled with chronic illnesses and impairments that may or may not
need accommodation. These individuals may have diﬀerent disability origin stories not necessarily tied to the social determinants of health. These diﬀerences
matter, for example, for how the individual experiences harm and what legal
remedies might make them whole if they experience individual or group discrimination. From a movement perspective, these distinctions matter too with
respect to whether individuals will embrace or reject disability identity (or something in between).116
These three groups appear to be dissimilar at first according to their relationship with disability (no impairment, congenital impairment that may or may not
be a direct result of state violence and discrimination). However, understanding
the connections and nuance allows us to identify the unifying thread—subordination and the social model of disability. The people regarded as disabled are
labeled as such because of the historical association of blackness with disability
and disability as an accepted proxy for incapacity or deficiency. A second category
of disabled people of color may acquire disability because of structural inequities
in the allocation of resources or, for example, poor housing located on or near
environmental toxins. With respect to the third and overlapping category, peo-

113.

See SINS INVALID, supra note 74, at 95 (“As survivors of environmental injury, we are planetary
whistle blowers; we are the canaries in the coal mine that our planet is becoming after 500
years of colonist destruction and capitalist expansion.”).
114. See Michael Martinez, Flint, Michigan: Did Race and Poverty Factor into Water Crisis?, CNN
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/us/flint-michigan-water-crisis-race
-poverty/index.html [https://perma.cc/UX7Q-2AB2]; Vann R. Newkirk II, Trump’s EPA
Concludes Environmental Racism Is Real, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-trump-administration-finds-that
-environmental-racism-is-real/554315 [https://perma.cc/V7GB-Y9W7].
115. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007) (challenging the conventional view in torts law that
disability undermines one’s enjoyment in life and citing social science research to paint a different picture than the one advanced by plaintiﬀs’ lawyers in tort cases); Elizabeth F. Emens,
Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383 (describing the discrepancy between the “outside”
view of disability as a tragedy and the “inside” view that reflects the same levels of happiness
that nondisabled people have).
116. See Eyer, supra note 92, at 557, 567.
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ple with disabilities, according to the social model, are disabled by society’s responses to their diﬀerent capabilities. Integrating race and disability should not
mean the elimination of one identity; that is, any intersectional theory must see
both race and disability theories as critical to understanding what happens with
multiply marginalized individuals and groups. While existing theories may advance the social model as a diagnostic or remedial lens, they do not capture how
people’s relationships to disability (direct, familial, none, congenital, acquired)
aﬀect their willingness to engage with or claim disability as a socio-political
identity.
2. Tensions at the Intersections
Conversations about disability among the three groups listed above—people
of color without disabilities treated as disabled; people of color who become disabled because of state action (or inaction), and disabled people of color with
longer histories of disability (congenital, early acquisition)—are complicated by
the diﬃcult relationship between state subordination of people of color by and
through disability as well as the use of state institutions—medicine, police, prisons.
For example, some parts of the civil-rights movement for racial justice who
sought to portray Black people as “just like” White people, reached for public
images to explicitly counter existing narratives of incapacity and incompetence.117 Discussions of disability within communities of color, according to
some activists, could undermine broader civil-rights advocacy and were to be
avoided. For example, in 1986, Bob Kafka, the founder of American Disabled for
Attendant Programs Today (ADAPT)118 requested assistance from legendary
civil-rights icon, Rosa Parks, to lead ADAPT’s protest of Detroit’s Public Transit
Association.119 The account of this story states that Rosa Parks declined the request because she did not want to “embarrass the black political establishment
of her hometown, including Coleman Young, the city’s first African American
mayor.”120 Another example of the tension between racial justice and disability
relates to the political alignment with rhetorical libertarian and fiscal conservative positions that stressed the value of disability rights as moving people from

117.

See Lukin, supra note 28, at 312 (“[A]s postwar civil rights agitations grew, the stakes surrounding public portrayals of blackness also increased.”).
118. See ADAPT, https://adapt.org [https://perma.cc/GL6G-XVZL].
119. See Jennifer L. Erkulwater, How the Nation’s Largest Minority Became White: Race Politics and
the Disability Rights Movement, 1970-1980, 30 J. POL’Y HIST. 367, 368 (2018).
120. Id.
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welfare rolls to financial independence.121 This discursive move, in some ways,
pitted disability rights against those conversations in the late 1980s around Black
Americans and welfare dependence that Congress would respond to with comprehensive welfare reforms in 1996.122 A third example, Black American novelist
and activist, John Oliver Killens, tried to convince literary giant, Ralph Emerson,
not to include Black, disabled veterans with psychiatric disabilities in his work
precisely because of a fear of entrenchment of associations between disability and
race.123
Consider the ways disability sometimes operates within communities of
color through the loss of actor Chadwick Boseman to colon cancer.124 The tributes to Boseman poetically (and rightfully) honored his power, talent, and dignity.125 Yet, they also almost consistently glorified (and noted)—as an example
of this fortitude and dignity—his private battle to conquer his disability without
public attention and without requesting assistance. He gracefully painted a visual homage to Black icons, Thurgood Marshall, Jackie Robinson, and Marvel
Comics’ fictional King T’Challa (also known as the Black Panther), while privately managing chemotherapy and living with a chronic illness.126 This is not
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Id. at 369. This included watching “bi-partisan” coalitions form around disability rights while
civil-rights laws narrowed in hostile courts and Congressional committees. Recall as well that
many of the sponsors of the Americans with Disabilities Act were veterans and longstanding
members of the Republican Party, like Bob Dole, with aggressive views on racial-justice initiatives. LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST U.S. MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 8, 100-114 (2015) (describing
the bipartisan group of sponsors of the ADA); id. at 82 (quoting disability rights leader Justin
Dart on the challenge of shrinking civil rights overall at the time when disability advocates
worked to advance disability rights: “The day of civil rights is gone; there will never be another civil rights law passed”).
See Vanessa D. Johnson, Impact of Race and Welfare Reform on African American Single Mothers’
Access to Higher Education, 40 J. BLACK STUDS. 1041, 1041-42 (2010) (discussing stereotypes of
Black Americans on welfare in the 1980s and 1996 welfare-reform legislation).
Lukin, supra note, 28, at 312.
Reggie Ugwu & Michael Levenson, ‘Black Panther’ Star Chadwick Boseman Dies of Cancer at
43, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/movies/chadwick
-boseman-dead.html [https://perma.cc/CXM3-UD7A].
See, e.g., Adrian Matejka, Variations on a Lead: For Chadwick Boseman, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/04/movies/chadwick-boseman-adrian-matejka.html [https://
perma.cc/L8HL-8Q3S]; Barack Obama (@BarackObama), TWITTER (Aug. 29, 2020, 7:39
AM), https://twitter.com/BarackObama/status/1299718379440398337 [https://perma.cc
/5BED-CJTV] (“To be young, gifted, and Black; to use that power to give them heroes to look
up to; to do it all while in pain—what a use of his years.”).
See id.
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to say that Boseman was required to disclose his chronic illness to anyone; rather,
the operative question is whether Boseman had any choice in the matter.127
Two important facts emerged after Boseman’s death. First, Chadwick Boseman was a Black man with a disability.128 Second, Boseman could not be Black
and disabled and a superhero. It is hardly a stretch to say that had Boseman come
to the table with an apparent disability (for example, if he were a wheelchair
user), or disclosed a less apparent one, studios would likely have passed on making him Hollywood’s leading man.129
When news of Boseman’s death went viral on Twitter, a hostile debate ensued in response to a post by the Black Disability Collective that Chadwick Boseman was a Black man with a disability.130 Some people of color responded with
contempt chastising the Black Collective and others for calling him “disabled,” a
perceived slight to his strength and legacy. In response, the Black Disability Collective tweeted: “So many of y’all hate disabled people so much that you’re deeply
uncomfortable with Chadwick Boseman being referred to as disabled and his
experiences being discussed through a disability lens. Cancer is a disability. Unpack your discomfort with this.”131
This tension played out in the largely parallel development of the racial justice and disability-rights movements.132 The independent-living movement, for
127.

128.

129.

130.
131.
132.

See Jasmine E. Harris, Taking Disability Public, 160 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 38-49) (on file with author) (arguing that existing privacy incentives in disability law
and society undermine the broader normative shifts required to advance disability justice).
Boseman’s colon cancer likely met the legal definition of disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2018); see U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CANCER IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE ADA (May 15, 2013), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance
/cancer-workplace-and-ada# [https://perma.cc/FC5M-JD9H] (“As a result of changes made
by the ADAAA, people who currently have cancer, or have cancer that is in remission, should
easily be found to have a disability within the meaning of the first part of the ADA’s definition
of disability because they are substantially limited in the major life activity of normal cell
growth or would be so limited if cancer currently in remission was to recur.”).
Ari Saperstein, The Challenges of Being Disabled in Hollywood, WALL ST. J. MAG. (July 28, 2020)
(discussing the existence of disability discrimination in Hollywood), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/disabled-actors-hollywood-ada-30-11595939824 [https://perma.cc/F3WN-XFU4].
Black Collective (@BlackDisability), TWITTER (Aug. 28, 2020, 7:29 PM), https://twitter.com
/BlackDisability/status/1299534563815948294 [https://perma.cc/N9AE-SFMP].
Black Collective (@BlackDisability), TWITTER (Aug. 28, 2020, 10:59 PM), https://
twitter.com/BlackDisability/status/1299587426231431173 [https://perma.cc/FNL9-EBFZ].
There were certainly important overlaps, in part, because people who participated in both
movements shared both identities; however, for the most part, disability rights progressed as
a “white” movement and was understood to be diﬀerent from “race.” See Erkulwater, supra
note 119, at 272-73 (“The [early campaigns of disability organizations in the 1930s through
the 1950s] were waged largely, though not exclusively, by white men demanding access to a
labor market where race dictated the jobs available, the working conditions, and the prevailing
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example, made significant headways with white disabled people after its founding in Berkeley, California, but had more trouble with outreach into Black American communities. Disabled Black activist, Johnnie Lacy has explained this diﬃculty, in part, as a result of diﬀerent cultural conceptions of community and what
“independence” means.133
3. The Aftermath of Intersectional Discrimination
Consider the compounded eﬀects of structural race and disability subordination on the opportunities available for people at the intersections after they
experience the eﬀects of structural discrimination in their lives. For example, in
the case of Neli Latson, advocates successfully negotiated a conditional pardon
in 2015 from former Virginia Governor, Terry McAuliﬀe and transferred him to
a less restrictive setting, a stepdown program in Florida.134 On June 21, 2021, Neli
Latson received a full pardon from Governor Ralph Northam.135
Even with a full pardon, an apology, and access to ongoing community supports, Latson’s life will never be the same. According to Latson’s mother, Lisa
Alexander:
Every aspect of [Neli’s] life is supervised . . . . He’s not able to live in society. He’s not able to get a job and have a girlfriend. He hasn’t had an
opportunity to learn how to drive, to get a license. . . . These are rites of
passage, natural progressions you get to experience as a human being.
All of those things were stripped away from him.136
Whereas Latson once showed potential for independent, community living,
sources report that his continued trauma and fears make him more dependent
on assistance from others.137
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wages.”). Tensions arose between the goals of the independent living movement calling for a
move away from dependence on government benefits towards a rights-based model of selfsuﬃciency and inclusion and the broader civil-rights movement for racial justice seeking to
enhance public income supports. Id. at 273.
Lukin, supra note 28, at 310.
Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2-3.
Theresa Vargas, Neli Latson Is—Finally—Free. It Only Took 11 years, Two Governors and a National Conversation About Race and Disability, WASH. POST (June 23, 2021, 4:23 PM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/neli-latson-black-autistic-free/2021/06/23
/1024d4e4-d446-11eb-a53a-3b5450fdca7a_story.html [https://perma.cc/T43R-KGUZ].
Vargas, supra note 1.
Id.
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iii. toward an aesthetics of race and disability
Part III oﬀers an aesthetics lens to give meaning and nuance to intersectional
analyses about disability and race and further advance a disability-justice framework. I build on my prior theoretical work around aesthetics, specifically, the
importation of aesthetics theory into antidiscrimination law to help us understand the nature and process of subordination because of disability.138
A. Defining Aesthetics
I have argued in other work that one of the reasons that disability norms have
not shifted as Congress intended is that “[d]isability legal theories do not account for the ways in which the aesthetics of disability mediate rights and the integrative ideal.”139 The aesthetics of disability are those “visible sensory and behavioral markers that trigger particular aesthetic and aﬀective judgments about
marked individuals.”140 Contact theory—the core driver of law’s focus on integration as remedial—specifically, does not account for the ways that socially constructed markers of disability—for example, assistive devices like wheelchairs or
canes, non-normative speech and behaviors141—trigger what I describe as an
“aesthetic-aﬀective” process that makes it diﬃcult for nondisabled people to
overcome deeply rooted and seemingly intuitive aesthetic judgments.142
Aesthetics theories developed in the context of art and philosophy, two disciplines concerned, in part, with theorizing human embodiment. Classically focused on artworks, recognition of the beautiful and aspirations of the sublime,
contemporary scholars of aesthetic theories—especially critical aesthetics and
everyday aesthetics—challenge the notion of a single, universal standard of
138.

See Harris, supra note 13.
Id. at 897.
140. Harris, supra note 13, at 897 (“Disability rights law, like other areas of antidiscrimination law,
relies on contact theory and its chosen prescription, integration. The contact hypothesis posits
that increasing opportunities for interactions between diverse groups can, under the right
conditions, foster greater acceptance.”). See also Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Allport’s Intergroup Hypothesis: Its History and Influence, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY
YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 263-73 (John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick & Laurei A. Rudman eds., 2005)
(discussing the evolution of Gordon Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis in social psychology, its preconditions, and its progeny). Allport opined that four positive features of intergroup contact could reduce prejudice between groups: “(a) equal status between the groups,
(b) common goals, (c) intergroup cooperation, and (d) the support of authorities, law or
custom.” Id. at 264.
141. See Harris, supra note 13, at 953-57 (oﬀering a chart of examples of aesthetic markers of disability—both appearance-based and behavioral-based).
142. Id. at 931.
139.
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beauty.143 They also confront the ways in which these standards developed by a
few for a few, much in the way that critical legal scholars argue that the normative baseline underwriting law and its institutions was established by a few white
men, for a few white men. On the disability front, aesthetics oﬀer not only a
space to question (and trace) existing norms of beauty but also how bodies function, perform, and move in the world, as well as which capabilities are privileged
and why. The primary aesthetic values associated with disability are beauty,
health, and eﬀortlessness.144
Aesthetic judgements about bodies145 can subordinate, oppress, or reinforce
existing structures of hegemony. Attraction, repulsion, anger, and disgust are all
ways of responding to bodies. The structural roots of what we see and feel in
response to certain aesthetic markers reflect well-sedimented values. They serve
“a disciplinary function.”146 Those unable to meet those standards are “condemned” and incur penalties in areas “unrelated to attractiveness: worse education, parental care, and healthcare; diminished employment prospects and earnings; harsher punishment in schools during childhood and in the criminaljustice system in adulthood; and reduced likelihood of receiving needed help,
among many others.”147
B. The Benefits of Aesthetic Theories
Aesthetic theories can help us unpack intersectional discrimination. A comparative-subordination lens remains useful to understand how concerns about
preserving white control over power and wealth shaped the meaning of both race
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See, e.g., YURIKO SAITO, EVERYDAY AESTHETICS 11 (2007) (discussing the classic hierarchies
that limit aesthetics to Western fine art or the experience of art more broadly while neglecting
“other dimensions of our aesthetic life that we engage in almost daily, in forming preferences,
judgments, design strategies, or courses of action”). Critical aesthetics question the classic
normative focus of this interdisciplinary area on fine art with the goal of creating a sublime,
though distant, relationship with a work of fine art. Everyday aesthetics is one type of critical
aesthetic scholarship that shifts our attention to everyday experiences and objects.
See Harris, supra note 13, at 959. Disability scholars such as Tobin Siebers and Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson have discussed the ways art and literature manifest aesthetic values such
as beauty and health. See, e.g., TOBIN SIEBERS, DISABILITY AESTHETICS 1-20 (2010) (introducing and defining the concept of “disability aesthetics” as an “attempt to theorize the representation of disability in modern art . . . [a refusal] to recognize the representation of the healthy
body—and its definition of harmony, integrity, and beauty—as the sole determination of the
aesthetic.”); ROSEMARIE GARLAND THOMSON, EXTRAORDINARY BODIES: FIGURING PHYSICAL
DISABILITY IN AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE (1997).
By “body” I mean the physical, mental, and behavioral.
Sherri Irvin, Introduction: Why Body Aesthetics?, in BODY AESTHETICS 1 (Sherri Irvin, ed. 2016).
Id. at 1-2.
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and disability. Segregation and invisibility in both the race and disability contexts were state sponsored attempts to move that which society deemed “ugly”
or “disgusting” and hide it away to appease white fears. Law and legal institutions adjudicated aesthetic markers and imposed penalties on those deviating
from well-guarded norms. For example, early local ordinances known as the
“ugly laws” regulated the visibility and movement of those bearing socially and
politically disfavored marks—criminality, poverty, physical or mental disabilities.148 Contemporary local ordinances149 regulating homelessness in public
spaces share many of the same substantive goals of disciplining non-normative
bodies and minds and protecting the public from discomfort and, perhaps, from
triggering existential fears and dread.150
Incorporating aesthetic theories into current discussions of intersectionality
and disability justice adds to the literature in the following ways:
1. Helps Us Understand the Aesthetic-Aﬀective Process Taking Place
Encounters with and interpretation of the body are central goals of disability
studies. More accurately, disability studies interrogates the “idea of the
norm . . . [as] less a condition of human nature than . . . a feature of a certain
kind of society.” 151 How we perceive other bodies and minds—including which
148.

See SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 3-5(2009).
149. See No Safe Place: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY 7-9 (2014), https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/No_Safe
_Place.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PCC-LEB] (describing laws that criminalize homelessness).
In Santa Cruz, California, for example, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty reported that 83% of homeless people in the area lack shelter or housing options. Id. at 8.
Yet, Santa Cruz has strict punitive codes that impose criminal and civil penalties for camping,
lying down or sleeping in public places or vehicles. See SANTA CRUZ MUNICIPAL CODE,
ch. 6.36, § 6.36.060 (“Any campsite established in the city in violation of this chapter is declared to be a public nuisance, and the chief of police, . . . upon a determination that such a
campsite constitutes an immediate threat to the health, safety or welfare of persons in the city,
including persons using the campsite, is authorized and empowered to remove any such
campsite forthwith.”).
150. See Therí A. Pickens, Blue Blackness, Black Blueness: Making Sense of Blackness and Disability,
50 AFR. AM. REV. 93, 98-99 (2017) (“It is a hallmark of disability experience that one is sequestered away (often in institutions and private homes). This is of course a diﬀerent kind of
segregation from Jim Crow, but the two have an odd similarity in that they attempt to publicly
erase instantiations of disability and blackness so that those who fear, dislike, or misunderstand them do not have to come into contact with them.”).
151. Lennard J. Davis, Introduction: Normality, Power, and Culture, in DISABILITY STUDIES READER 1
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th ed., 2013). Davis describes the shift from an Aristotelian focus on
the ideal man to a statistically constructed “normal” man. Id. This emphasis on the natural
existence of a “norm” implies that a majority of people should be part of the norm and, by
definition, non-normative bodies of people with disabilities are deviations from a norm, and,
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ones we notice152—are central questions of inquiry for critical race and disability
studies scholars.153 Disability-studies scholar Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s
conception of “staring” directly relates to critical aesthetician and philosopher,
George Yancy’s “white gaze.” Yancy describes deeply rooted histories of structural discrimination baked into the acts of staring or white gazing as “a violent
process . . . not an atomic or an inaugural event that captures, in an unmediated
fashion, the bareness, as it were, of ‘objects.’”154
Perceptions of whiteness as a universal norm set up not only blackness as
nonnormative, but also disability. Yancy explains that deviance from whiteness,
therefore, “the Black body as ersatz, aesthetically deformed, morally disabled
(think here of the curse of Ham or Canaan), excessive, monstrous, disgusting,
that is distasteful.”155 Whiteness, accordingly, creates the normative baseline by
establishing proper mannerisms, comportment, acceptable aesthetic and emotional responses to certain images and stimuli, triggers for images and emotions
defining “threat” and danger, and even acceptable behavioral and sensory responses.156 Contrary to theories of scientific racism, “whiteness” is not a fixed
experience but a “perceptual practice . . . that constructs the Black body as an
object of disgust and fear” when, for example, a black person simply enters what
are considered white spaces and “disrupt[s] the harmony and symmetry.” 157

152.

153.

154.
155.
156.
157.
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by extension, those who possess bodily diﬀerences are deviants. “An important consequence
of the idea of the norm is that it divided the total population into standard and nonstandard
subpopulations.” Id. at 3. This standardization oﬀered a ready tool of disenfranchisement that
connects disability with other historically marginalized groups such as Black, Indigenous, and
Latinx people, immigrants, women, and sexual minorities.
See GARLAND-THOMSON, supra note 144, at 6 (2009); id. at 18 (“Social expectations shape our
ocular sorting processes, making certain appearances and actions unusual and cataloguing
people as alien or native, extraordinary or ordinary. Zora Neale Hurston wrote, for instance,
that she became ‘colored’ only when she was surrounded by white people.”).
See, e.g., ROSEMARIE GARLAND-THOMSON, STARING: HOW WE LOOK 6 (2009) (describing
“staring” as “[a] flare up when we glimpse people who look or act in ways that contradict our
expectations.”); George Yancy, White Embodied Gazing, the Black Body as Disgust, and the Aesthetics of Un-Suturing, in BODY AESTHETICS 243 (Sherri Irvin, ed., 2016).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 245.
Id. (defining the scope of proper reactions including: “the activation of sweat glands, breathing patterns, heart rate, auditory and olfactory responses”).
Irvin, supra note 146, at 8 (citation omitted).
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2. Demonstrates the Role of Law in Defining Aesthetic Markers of Race and
Disability as Tools of Subordination
Laws have created and reinforced aesthetic markers of race and disability.
Legal historians Ariela Gross and Alejandro de la Fuente discuss the ways that
early colonists “created race through law.”158 This process of “[l]egal race making,” as they describe it, was a distinctive feature of the evolution of slavery in
the United States. “[T]he law constituted “‘blacks’ as social outcasts, conflating
their social existence with enslavement” such that “blackness, rather than enslavement, [became] the mark of degradation,” and outlasted slavery.159
Aesthetics allow us to understand compounded eﬀects of racism and ableism
and interdependence as diametrically opposed to “whiteness,” competition, and
independence. The marks of blackness (and to some degree, race more broadly),
at times, mapped onto disability and vice versa. “If, in the dominant culture’s
vocabulary, blackness signified subhumanity, it also came to signify congenital
‘disability,’ another form of “diﬀerence” that further marked black bodies for expulsion.”160 One example of law’s early construction of blackness as disability is
military enlistment that prohibited “lunatics, idiots, and Negros.”161 “[I]t was
imperative that the black body and the black ‘mind’ be portrayed as uninjured
by the injuring institution of slavery in order to disprove one of the main antiblack arguments that surfaced after emancipation—that slavery had made
blacks ‘unfit’ for citizenship.”162
State institutions and actors policed the line between whiteness and blackness through rhetorical and legal declarations of the biological diﬀerences and
inferiority of Black people that made them unable to manage participation in
democratic governance and civic duties. Medical and scientific “proof” then became the means of marking people.163 Scientists and thought leaders at some of
the nation’s top universities went to great lengths to make blackness a concrete,
identifiable, and thus, biological category including dissecting black bodies and
announcing such biological markers as cranial measurements proved Black people had smaller skulls and, thus, lower intellect, poor moral barometers, and

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE & ARIELA GROSS, BECOMING FREE, BECOMING BLACK: RACE, FREEDOM, AND LAW IN CUBA, VIRGINIA, AND LOUISIANA 15 (2020).
Id. at 15-16.
JENNIFER C. JAMES, A FREEDOM BOUGHT WITH BLOOD: AFRICAN AMERICAN WAR LITERATURE
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 13 (2007).
Lukin, supra note 28, at 311-12 (quoting JAMES, supra note 160, at 15).
JAMES, supra note 160, at 15.
See Erkulwater, supra note 119, at 371 (“Between 1880 and 1920, theories of scientific racism
equated whiteness with physical fitness, mental rigor, and genetic superiority.”).
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were “not of the same blood” as white people.164 “Whiteness,” therefore, became
synonymous with health, “physical fitness, mental rigor, and genetic superiority.”165
These constructed markers of blackness—”constructed” in that they had no
inherent meaning or value—became “legitimate” justifications for restrictions on
access to public spaces, travel, as well as the denial of legal personhood.166 One
interesting historical insight oﬀered by de la Fuente and Gross is the framing of
physiological and moral inferiority provided a seemingly “neutral” and factbased justification for slavery and close management of Black people. In this way,
the arguments for slavery relied more on manufactured physiological diﬀerences
than on politics or philanthropy.167
Tying freedom of movement, economic livelihood, and socio-political participation to race rather than status heightened the stakes for legal recognition as
white (and able-bodied) identity as opposed to Black (or disabled) identity.168
164. DE LA FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 178 (explaining the lengths white southerners went

165.
166.

167.
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to show that Black people were “a diﬀerent species, or that they had degenerated to such a
degree that they were biologically diﬀerent and hopelessly handicapped”); see also id. at 17980 (citing John Calhoun’s speech to Congress in 1837 where he claimed that there are “two
races of diﬀerent origin, and distinguished by color, and other physical diﬀerences, as well as
intellectual are brought together”).
Erkulwater, supra note 119, at 371.
See, e.g., FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 129 (2012) (describing how race is not a biological marker or
category, but rather a political category that has “staggering biological consequences” because
of the eﬀects of social inequality on health); IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING:
THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 3-4 (2016) (explaining scientific racism
and biological determinism as the roots of segregationist and assimilationist ideologies);
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING
OF LIBERTY 61 (2d ed. 2017) (“White Americans had for over two centuries developed an understanding of the races as biologically distinct groups, marked by inherited attributes of inferiority and superiority.”); THE TROUBLE WITH POST-BLACKNESS 15 (Houston A. Baker & K.
Merinda Simmons, eds. 2017) (“My own conclusion is one that suggests there is no a priori
blackness, no blackness removed or separate from the discourses—and imbedded interests—
naming it. When we think of code-switching and racial performativity as innocuous or objective terms used to describe certain actions within a universe of personal experience, we forget
that all descriptions are situated and decidedly not neutral.”); Heather M. Kleider-Oﬀutt,
Alesha D. Bond & Shanna E. A. Hegerty, Black Stereotypical Features: When a Face Type Can
Get You in Trouble, 26 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 28, 28 (2017) (discussing empirical
research on stereotypical “Black faces” with a “combination of facial features including full
lips, wide nose, dark eye color, coarse hair, and dark complexion”).
DE LA FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 179 (internal citation omitted). In this vein, slavery
was advanced as a positive good precisely because it oﬀered structure and a path to “civilization not ‘through a process of freedom’ but rather ‘through long periods of servitude.’” Id. at
179.
Id. at 178.
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Self-identification did not matter in this story. It was about how courts and communities perceived you.
What evidence became relevant to and probative of whiteness or blackness
in trials on racial identity? Aesthetics help us understand how courts and procedural rules allowed people to move across the racial categories. In addition to the
“biological” markers of race noted above, litigants relied on the performance of
acts of citizenship—serving in a militia, as a witness, or on a jury; voting; or
carrying a handgun—associated with whiteness as probative evidence of white
racial identity.169 This move created a bright line between those who performed
citizenship (and, thus, were racially “white”) and those who did (or could) not
(and, thus, were racially “Black”). As a result, disabled people of color in this
schematic oﬀered two axes for civic exclusion—blackness and disability—which
were mutually constitutive and reinforcing.
Witnesses oﬀered evidence of appearances and reputation, probative of
white racial identity. Performing social acts of whiteness included Black men
marrying white women; “associating with white people or black people on a social level;” “attending parties;” and even dancing.170 Notably, “[b]y deferring to
juries, judges allowed evidence of racial performance to become as important to
the definition of race as fractions of ancestry were in the statutory law.”171
The probative value of the evidence of whiteness was highly gendered. While
performances of citizenship lent credence to claims of “white manhood,”
women’s whiteness relied on “sexual purity and moral character.”172 de la Fuente
and Gross tell the story of two of the most widely followed racial-identity trials
in New Orleans. Two women—Sally Miller and Alexina Morrison—claimed they
were “white” and sued for their freedom. Despite a written record that might
suggest otherwise, they claimed victory, in part, by advancing evidence of their
markers as white women: “beauty, sexual purity, and moral character” such as
industriousness and cooperation.173 Physiological evidence of racial diﬀerences—for example, eyes, teeth, or bone structure—could be countered successfully, as Alexina Morrison showed, with a proﬀer of association with white

169.
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171.
172.
173.

Id. at 203 (oﬀering examples of identity performances intended to demonstrate one’s ‘whiteness’); see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and
the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1524-26 (2010) (describing how courts interpreted the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms as inapplicable to disfavored, marginalized
populations and regulated the line between citizenship (white) and non-citizenship (nonwhite)).
DE LA FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 200-01, 207.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 208.
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women, including attendance at social events such as dances.174 The litigation of
racial identity in Virginia and New Orleans, for example, “helped to constitute
whiteness as a category of social superiority, inseparable from the privileges of
citizenship and from gendered notions of purity, beauty, and propriety.”175
3. Creates an Extralegal Means of Public Enforcement of Aesthetic Norms
that Reinforces Structural Subordination
Tying rights and privileges to specific identity categories (directly or indirectly) can (and did) deputize the public to surveil and police non-normative
Black and disabled bodies. Directly, local ordinances like the “ugly laws” emboldened private individuals to police non-normativity. Similarly, local ordinances allowed private individuals to police blackness, in part, because of the
association of “blackness” with slavery and disenfranchisement. This “empowered whites to stop” Black people “at any time to verify that they were in possession of a written pass to be in the streets of New Orleans or on the ‘public
roads.’”176 Stand your ground laws like the one in Florida that led George Zimmerman to pursue Trayvon Martin are the progeny of these early ordinances and
practices.177 Similarly, local ordinances that encourage private individuals to report alleged abuses of disabled parking, for example, should be viewed in this
light.178

174.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 217-18.
176. Id. at 35.
177. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2020) (“A person who is in a dwelling or residence in which
the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground
and use or threaten to use.”); Eyder Peralta, Trayvon Martin Killing Puts ‘Stand Your Ground’
Law in Spotlight, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections
/thetwo-way/2012/03/19/148937626/trayvon-martin-killing-puts-stand-your-ground-law
-in-spotlight [https://perma.cc/GC3K-7S69]. See generally CAROLINA LIGHT, A HISTORY OF
AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE (2017) (explaining the history of stand
your ground laws and the role race played).
178. See, e.g., Disabled Placard Abuse, CITY SACRAMENTO, https://www.cityofsacramento.org
/Public-Works/Parking-Services/Disabled-Person-Parking/Placard-Abuse [https://perma
.cc/X2QU-JAKY] (“To help reduce the misuse of disabled placards, the Sacramento Task
Force On Placard ABUSE (STOP ABUSE) was formed on November 12, 1996. STOP ABUSE
consists of specially trained Parking Enforcement Oﬃcers who investigate complaints on disabled placard abuse and issue misdemeanor citations of the California Vehicle Code when
necessary. . . . If you feel someone is misusing a disabled placard, or if you have any information regarding DP placard abuse, you may contact one of the following agencies.”).
175.
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4. Helps Explain the Longevity and Resistance to Change of Racism and
Ableism but Also Oﬀers Remedial Paths Forward
The deep aesthetic and emotional responses suggest that the normative shifts
sought by antidiscrimination laws may be more diﬃcult than social-justice proponents understand. Intersectionality locates the harm at the intersection, the
person who is both a person of color and disabled. Aesthetics help us understand
why, how deep this discrimination runs, what exclusion and reactions might
look like at those intersections and then how to think about meaningful remedies.
One practical implication of aesthetics research is to challenge the eﬀectiveness of “awareness” and “training” prescriptions that do not adjust for aesthetic
and aﬀective biases. For example, in the context of police reforms to promote
racial and disability justice, Devon Carbado and Patrick Block describe a cyclical
feedback dynamic such that increased contact or exposure to Black men and
awareness of biases may actually reinforce assumptions of Black men as dangerous and “render black boys less cognizable as youth.”179
Aesthetics scholars suggest that attention to aesthetic-aﬀective processes can
promote change. George Yancy, for example, describes a process of “suturing”
and “un-suturing”:
Because white people collectively engage in habituated embodied white
racist practices that are mutually reinforcing within the context of socially
quotidian spaces, and that are further supported by deeply ingrained and
sedimented historical, institutional structures, the assumption that white
people can engage in practices of un-suturing solely through the act of
intention, as one might change his/her clothes at will, is misleading.180
Un-suturing, then, is not easy, automatic or magical, but, instead, requires
“‘the active repetition of acts, verbal and nonverbal, that continues to communicate’ the responsibility to engage opportunity for creating fissures in the system,
disruptions in one’s mode of being white.”181
Because disability is often understood as an aesthetic disruption when it is
“visible”182 or intentionally made hyper-visible through performance, disability
itself can create the conditions for un-suturing described by George Yancy, the
kind required to disrupt the fraught status quo. This is yet another reason to
179.

Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence? 51 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REV. 159, 173 (2016) (citation omitted).
180. Yancy, supra note 153, at 257.
181. Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
182. Tobin Siebers, In/ Visible, in BODY AESTHETICS 141-42 (Sherri Irvin, ed. 2016).
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center and move out of the way for disabled people of color, in particular, disabled women of color to generate not basic cognitive dissonance that can be swept
away, but an aesthetic-aﬀective process that oﬀers an opportunity to grapple
with and un-suture ties to white, ableist histories and institutions.
A.W. Eaton oﬀers a non-legal intervention to change the aesthetic-aﬀective
process triggered by non-normativity. She argues that “resistance to fat oppression” in society, for example, can take shape in the “Aristotelian strategy of altering bodily taste through the skillful selection and use of representations”—quite
literally diverse images in media but also representations in places of power.183
“[T]he strategy of consciously altering the kinds of representations consumed
by an individual or a society can be extended to other forms of appearance-related oppression based in race, disability, age, gender identity and other visible
markers of ‘diﬀerence.’”184
C. Application of Aesthetics
1. Debunking Police Training as a Panacea for Police Violence
There are well-known incidents of police violence against people of color
who also are people with disabilities—for example, Sandra Bland was a person
with psychiatric disability.185 However, police do not see the disability; rather,
police only see a Black or brown body and its movements as threats through the
lens of race. Oﬃcers, trained and equipped to enforce compliance,186 have a distorted view of the situation because they have mistakenly applied a flawed lens
to the person’s behavior. Yet media reports continue to discuss police shootings
of people of color with disabilities through the singular lens of race.

183.

Irvin, supra note 146, at 3 (describing Eaton’s work); see A.W. Eaton, Taste in Bodies and Fat
Oppression, in BODY AESTHETICS 48-53 (Sherri Irvin, ed. 2016).
184. Irvin, supra note 146, at 3.
185. See Perry & Carter-Long, supra note 99, at 7 (noting that police departments were not required
before 2014 to report voluntarily on killings, so the authors collected data based on public
news stories, available public records, and other sources); see also Kate Masters, Police Kill Far
More People with Guns than Key Federal Data Sources Show, TRACE (Jan. 17, 2021), https://
www.thetrace.org/2016/03/police-fatal-shootings-federal-data-fbi-cdc [https://perma.cc
/6K4Q-7CEZ] (discussing problems in collecting data from federal sources about the police’s
use of fatal force).
186. See Ibram X. Kendi, Compliance Will Not Save Me, ATLANTIC (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www
.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/compliance-will-not-save-my-body/618637
[https://perma.cc/6ZW7-86RM] (rejecting the notion that greater compliance with police
by people of color will resolve or at least mitigate the violence).
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I want to return to Neli Latson. Aesthetics oﬀer at least two unique insights
here. First, research on associations between dangerousness and Black men suggests that the “faces of black men attract more visual attention from white respondents than comparable faces of white men” even when those Black men’s
faces are neutral without showing signs of anger.187 Carbado and Block draw the
following conclusion from these studies: “a black man who is providing literally
no evidence of threat is nonetheless likely to attract the attention of police oﬃcers, so ingrained are the stereotypes linking him with threat.”188 When the community member called the police to report Neli Latson, the person noted that he
might have a gun (something ultimately shown to be false).189 This person and
the oﬃcer who responded may have looked at Neli sitting on the grass and noticed he was in a predominantly white neighborhood, which may have triggered
aesthetic associations of disgust and threat; they responded accordingly. Because
Neli Latson did not show the aesthetic markers of disability in an obvious way,
the dominant frame of reference was race.190
Second, debates about the proper legal and policy solution for police violence
are front and center. Some who wish to adopt a more reformist approach to address police violence tout training as an important point of intervention. The
aesthetics literature discussed above cautions against a traditional transfer of information as a fix. Would better training have spared Neli Latson from harm?
Not necessarily—at least not in the current format. One idea for meaningful
training for those who adopt this position that actively engages aesthetic and
aﬀective dimensions of race and disability may be the use of technology like virtual reality. This can simulate (or recreate) past encounters between police and
communities of color, disability, and those at the intersection and, as a result,
trigger sensory and cognitive aspects of observation and action.191 Only a handful of police departments have started to experiment with virtual reality in their

187.

Carbado & Rock, supra note 179, at 168-69.
Id. at 169.
189. See Vargas, supra note 1.
190. Of course, the behavioral response of “fight or flight” is very common among autistic people
but was not recognized.
191. I am not adopting a position on the abolition/reformist continuum. Rather, for those advocating training, I invoke the aesthetics literature to show that most training out there today is
not going to be eﬀective because it fails to engage the emotional reactions.
188.
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training, 192 but theses trainings appear to be designed to address biases on the
basis of race or disability (like autism or psychiatric disabilities) but not both.193
2. Intersectional Race and Disability Discrimination in Employment
Aesthetics theories also help us better understand intersectional discrimination in other areas such as employment. Consider workplace appearance or
grooming codes.194 In Cleveland C. v. Department of Defense, complainants, Black
men, worked for the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) and had pseudofolliculitis barbae (PB), a skin condition caused by shaving which is more common among Black men because of their curly hair.195 One way to manage this
condition is to keep a short beard rather than to regularly shave. PFPA had a no
facial hair policy; they previously granted medical waivers but then suddenly
stopped granting such waivers citing concerns about complainants’ abilities to
use respirators with their beards even though they never faced an emergency
when they needed respirators and they “all passed standard respirator fit tests
with short beards.”196 Complainants then requested a reasonable accommodation but PFPA denied their requests categorically without conducting individualized assessments.197
Pre-2008 Amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADAAA),
plaintiﬀs alleging discrimination on the basis of PB did not succeed in court and
post-2008, there were no EEOC decisions about PB and disability discrimination
under the ADAAA.198 To fully understand the nature of the harm experienced by
the complainants, we need to apply an intersectional lens that shows why they
faced both race and disability discrimination as Black men with PB subjected to
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Emma Tucker, Ryan Young & Julia Jones, With Virtual Reality Police Training, Sacramento Tries
to ‘Get to a Much Better Place,’ CNN (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/27/us
/virtual-reality-police-training-sacramento/index.html [https://perma.cc/P5TT-RZ8J].
Alex Pasternack, VR Is Training Cops to Empathize with the People They Might Kill, FAST COMPANY (June 17, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90353647/police-virtual-reality
-empathy-training-mental-health [https://perma.cc/45DK-22Q4].
See, e.g., Mayeri, supra note 50, at 730 (discussing how intersectionality works in employment
and its roots).
Cleveland C. v. Dep’t. of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170405-0120170414 (2017); see Developments at the EEOC: P&K Wins Reasonable Accommodation Case, PASSMAN & KAPLAN (Oct. 16,
2018), https://www.passmanandkaplan.com/blog/2018/10/developments-at-the-eeoc-pk
-wins-reasonable-accommodation-case [https://perma.cc/T7EQ-45B4].
Id.
Id.
Id.
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grooming codes based on white men’s facial hair. Grooming codes are rooted in
aesthetic norms that privilege whiteness.199
conclusion
The growing body of scholarship focused on race and disability signals a new
direction for critical legal scholarship. This intersectionality revolution has only
scratched the surface in disability law and requires further theorizing. This Essay
begins a broader scholarly agenda in this arena. Aesthetics theories of discrimination oﬀer a useful lens to wrestle with both race and disability as a common
point of analysis and as a diagnostic lens to understand how society has constructed disability and racial markers and has used them against the other.
I want to share one concluding question, the answers to which can further
advance critical race and disability justice: how do we track race-disability (and
other axes of) intersectionality in law? Disability data are hard to come by, in
part, because of an association of disability with medical data and, thus, health
privacy laws.200 The need for intersectional public data collection and dissemination could not be more important. Racial and disability justice are at the forefront of the major issues of the day—police violence, coronavirus, access to
healthcare, gig employment, and living wages. Calls for standardized intersectional data collection remain largely unheeded, but the regular collection and
public dissemination creates opportunities for future research and public accountability in policing, healthcare, and employment.201
Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of
California—Davis School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Dartmouth College.
Thanks to Guy-Uriel Charles and Melissa Murray for thoughtful comments on earlier

199.

See, e.g., D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got
to Do with It? 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355 (2008) (arguing that grooming codes around hair are
a form of race discrimination).
200. See Harris, supra note 127 (manuscript at 21-57) (discussing the ways law and society have
treated disability as a private fact subject to public protection and regulation).
201. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 160-65) (arguing for greater public data collection disaggregated
to better understand intersectionality); see also Josh Dubrow, Why Should We Account for Intersectionality in Quantitative Analysis of Survey Data?, in INTERSECTIONALITY UND KRITIK:
NEUE PERSPEKTIVEN FÜR ALTE FRAGEN (Vera Kallenberg, Jennifer Meyer & Johanna M. Müller, eds., 2013) (arguing the need for intersectional approaches not only in qualitative but especially in quantitative research); Jenny K. Rodriguez, Intersectionality and Qualitative Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
METHODS: HISTORY AND TRADITIONS (2018) (discussing the potential for the development of
intersectional qualitative research methods).
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